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For decades, the UN has failed to mediate a settlement in Cyprus because of a general and 
profound weakness: it is unable, outside of unity and resolve on the Security Council, to offer 
direct incentives to parties in conflict that would shape their calculus towards conflict resolution, 
or to control the actions of third parties in ways that would incentivize conflict resolution or 
prevent disincentives. Within this vacuum, the UN has alternated its mediation strategy during 
the past two decades in Cyprus between two different forms, meditration (Annan Plan, 2002-04) 
and mediation-lite (2008-2015), before reverting to a more conventional mediating role in the 
lead-up to the Crans-Montana conference in 2017. Meditration and Mediation-lite both failed, 
with the fortunes of the peace process during each of these periods being shaped importantly by 
domestic politics within the contesting camps and the balance of power between them.  The 
article elaborates on the conceptual distinction between meditration and mediation-lite.  It makes 
the case for a conventional mediation between these two extremes, but argues that even this has 




The UN has been present in its peacekeeping role in Cyprus since early 1964, and Cyprus is one 
of its longest standing missions, alongside Kashmir.  Since the island was partitioned in 1974, 
and particularly since the 1980s, the UN has also become increasingly involved, through the 
Secretary-General’s Good Offices, in negotiations aimed at a resolution of the Cyprus dispute.  
Indeed,  all UN Secretary-Generals from Perez de Cuellar on have been personally and actively 
involved in the Cyprus talks, as suggested by the “de Cuellar Draft Framework Agreement”, the 
“Ghali Set of Ideas”, the “Annan Plan”, the “Guterres Framework”, and so on.  None of these 
initiatives have succeeded in resolving the Cyprus problem, and Cyprus has become known as a 
‘diplomats graveyard’ (Lindahl 2019).  The UN’s lack of success in Cyprus can be attributed to 
its general inability, in the absence of unity and resolve in the Security Council, to exercise either 
‘coercive power’ or ‘reward power’ (Rubin 1992).  This has meant that it is unable to offer direct 
incentives to the parties in conflict, impose a settlement, or control or coordinate the actions of 
other (third) parties in a way that would incentivize agreement. In the resulting vacuum, the 
prospects for agreement have come to rest largely on domestic politics within each party, and on 




The UN’s weaknesses were clearly on display during its most ambitious attempt to achieve a 
comprehensive settlement in Cyprus: the Annan Plan (2004).  During the negotiations that 
preceded the presentation of the plan, the UN was unable to control the actions of the EU in 
particular, which decided to admit Cyprus (meaning the government-controlled or Greek Cypriot 
part of Cyprus) to the EU before a solution.  This removed an important incentive for Greek 
Cypriots to compromise.   Local politics on the Greek Cypriot side then led to the election, in 
2003, of a rejectionist leader, Tassos Papadopoulous, although his opposition to a settlement was 
relatively muted at first.   In these distinctly non-ideal conditions, the UN chose to ‘meditrate’ a 
settlement (Ker-Lindsay 2009), i.e. fill in key provisions on issues the sides could not agree on, 
even though the two communities were to have the final say through twin referendums.   On the 
key issue of security, the UN opted for provisions that leaned towards Turkey, reflecting its 
inability to push Turkey, a strong regional power, to compromise more (Palley  2005). The result 
was unsurprising: a massive rejection by Greek Cypriots.    
 
When negotiations resumed in 2008, the UN switched from “meditration” to “mediation-lite”, 
doing little more than chairing a process that was “Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led” (Michalis 
2013). This made it more likely that any resulting deal would be legitimate, but progress 
continued to be subject largely to the will of the parties, and this continued to be shaped by 
domestic politics and by the balance of power between the sides. The result was a long drift in 
negotiations, with progress intermittent and tied to the fortunes of moderates in local politics.   
 
In the lead-up to the Crans-Montana conference in June 2017, the UN shifted back to a more 
conventional and assertive mediation, although not going as far as meditration.  At Crans-
Montana, the new Secretary-General, Guterres, proposed a framework agreement that integrated 
and permitted trade-offs among the different elements of a comprehensive settlement, including 
the vital issue of security.  This represented a move away from the flawed ‘sequential’ process of 
the ‘mediation-lite’ period.   While Guterres helped bring the sides closer to an agreement than 
ever before, the conference collapsed, and the UN’s inability to drive the parties to compromise 
was again on display. While the UN has not succeeded on the Track 1 level, the article discusses 
some of its unsung contributions beyond this.    
 
Conceptual Framework: Meditration, Mediation-lite and Beyond 
 
Few studies have attempted to provide a comparative conceptual framework for understanding 
UN peace mediations.1 While some quantitative comparisons have investigated the relationship 
between mediation styles and crisis outcomes (Beardsley et al. 2006, Savun, 2008), the current 
literature does not offer the context-specific background for understanding the impact and most 
importantly the choice of specific mediation styles in the first place. Moreover,  to address 
broader questions of intractability (Ibid, Zartman 2001, Halperin & Bar-Tal 2011), most of these 
studies have compared mediation styles along alternative dimensions such as power asymmetries 
and incentives, openness to information and information biases, as well as the engagement of 
peacekeepers (ibid; see also Fisher 2001).  While important, these studies have often missed a 
critical element of mediation theory, i.e.  that of the latitude assumed by, or given to, external 




To address this gap, this article draws on the concept of ‘meditration’  introduced and criticized 
by Ker-Lindsay (2009),2 which is juxtaposed here with our alternative concept of ‘mediation-
lite’ as well as  conventional mediation. Meditration is a “hybrid form of peacemaking that 
combines elements of mediation and arbitration”. Conventional mediation involves external 
actors in a facilitating role that allows the contesting sides to reach a mutually acceptable 
agreement. Outsiders are able to offer proposals (with respect to process and substance), 
assistance and support, but the key emphasis is on facilitating agreement between the parties.    
Meditrators, in contrast, are ‘robust’ mediators who may insist on time-frames for negotiations, 
and then, if the sides cannot reach agreement, present one themselves or, at least, .‘bridge’ 
whatever gaps remain between the parties.  As this suggests,  meditrators may move from being 
mediators at one stage of a process to being arbitrators at another, later, stage:  ‘a mediator seeks 
to facilitate agreement between the parties, until such times as it is clear that the parties cannot 
reach an agreement, at which point the mediator ‘switches hats’ and takes on the role of 
arbitration” (cited, Ker-Lindsay 2009 225). Alternatively,  meditrators may be mediators on 
some issues but arbiters, or quasi-arbiters, on others.   In his reply to Ker-Lindsay, Noel (2009) 
suggests, for example, that Senator George Mitchell, who chaired the negotiations that produced 
peace in Northern Ireland, employed something akin to mediation and arbitration at different 
times. In addition, the British and Irish governments allowed much of the negotiations, including 
on the political institutions, to be negotiated between the sides, but they also applied significant 
arms-twisting on the unionist side in particular (McGarry 2019).  Meditration may be triggered 
by the UN if there is a consensus in the security council (Bosnia), by a third country following a 
humanitarian emergency (Nagorno-Karabakh) or the sides themselves might accept a process 
that combines international mediation and (binding) arbitration as suggested below by the cases 
of Belize-Guatemala or Ethiopia-Eritrea (Duijzentkunst and Dawkins, 2015). As implied in these 
examples, a consensus on the Security Council or critical historical junctures can help convert 
mediation with a ‘lite’ footprint into a more assertive meditration, or, as in Cyprus after 2008, 
vice-versa.   
  
In contrast, mediation-lite, as implied in the experience of Cyprus between 2008 and 2015,  
restricts external mediators to chairing meetings normally on neutral territory, conveying 
proposals from one side to the other in proximity talks or through shuttle diplomacy, maintaining 
a record of disagreements and convergences, offering international expertise to the sides through 
its consultants and those from other international organizations as well as promoting Track II 
activities and confidence-building measures. Both the process and agenda of negotiations are 
controlled by the sides and unlike conventional forms of mediation (Fisher, 2001), creative-
problem solving is driven primarily by the internal actors themselves rather than by the external 
mediators.   
 
Table 1 below summarizes the pros and cons of meditration and mediation-lite, and offers 
indicative examples of each.   Meditration and Mediation-lite are ideal categories, and there is a 














Main Features External actor(s) play a key role in determining 
both the process and the agenda in negotiations. 
They may initiate proposals for progress on 
various issues or even present conflicted sides 
with solutions on issues, or a comprehensive 
peace plan. Meditration might  be voluntary or 
include strong incentives and coercive diplomatic, 
legal or military elements.  It may also involve 
time frames and strict deadlines tied to specific 
incentives and sanctions. 
  
External actor(s) chair a process that is owned 
and led by the domestic parties i.e.,  the latter 
control both process and content of 
negotiations.   Mediation-lite aims for peace 
settlements that are seen as legitimate and 
beneficial by the opposing parties themselves. 
There are no externally-mandated deadlines or 
arms-twisting. External mediators are restricted 
regarding their capacity to introduce new ideas.   
Pros and Cons Meditration may be seen as biased by at least one 
of the sides and may fail to produce mutually 
acceptable outcomes. It may also infringe on state 
sovereignty. However, meditration may be 
beneficial if it helps parties to avoid a prolonged 
stalemate and protects civilian lives. It may also 
involve external implementation guarantees and 
legal supervision against the wishes of one or 
more parties.  Meditration can be effective if the 
external parties are able to impose their 
preferences or domestic parties endorse the 
arbitration mechanisms themselves.   
Mediation-lite is more likely to be perceived as 
impartial and legitimate. Progress in the 
negotiations is determined by indigenous 
capacity, willingness and knowledge.  The 
main limitation is that progress is conditional 
on the political agendas and objectives of the 
conflicting parties whose preferences might 
be  shaped by domestic politics 
or realpolitik.  Mediation-lite may be the only 
alternative if external mediators lack the 
willingness  and resources for a robust 
intervention or, in the case of the UN, if there is 
no consensus among the permanent members of 
the Security Council.    
Indicative 
Examples 
Lebanon Taif Accords 1989 (S. Arabia/Syria) 
Bosnia Dayton Peace Accords 1995 (US)  
Western Sahara Baker plan 1997 (UN)* 
Cyprus Annan Plan  2002-04 (UN)* 
Kosovo  Ahtisaari Plan 2009 (UN)* 
Guatemala-Belize 2018-19 (OAS/ICJ) 
Ethiopia-Eritrea 2018 (PCA/S. Arabia) 
Nagorno-Karabakh 2020 (Russia) 
  
Nagorno-Karabakh Minsk 1992- (OSCE)* 
Indonesia Aceh Agreement 2005 (Finland) 
Syrian Peace Talks 2011- (UN)* 
Colombia Peace Accords 2016 (Norway, Cuba) 
Cyprus talks 2008-2015 (UN)* 
Ukraine Minsk Protocol 2014- (OSCE)* 
Macedonia naming dispute 2018 (UN, EU) 
Sudan’s Juba agreement 2020 (UN, AU, Qatar)  















1. UN meditration in Cyprus:  The Annan Plan (2002-04)  
 
The Annan Plan (2002-04) was a comprehensive proposal for the settlement of the Cyprus 
problem proposed by the United Nations aiming to align the reunification of Cyprus with the 
2004 eastern enlagement of the European Union.  The Plan required the support of both Cypriot 
communities in referendums, but was massively rejected by 76 per cent of Greek Cypriots while 
being backed by sixty-five per cent of Turkish Cypriots.  The plan failed because the UN was 
unable to directly incentivize the Greek Cypriots to accept it, or Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots 
to make concessions of the order that might have won over the Greek Cypriots.  Even though the 
United Nations came to be vested with meditration powers, it was also unable to control the 
actions of external parties that were in a position to directly incentivize a settlement.  
 
The most important of these external parties was the European Union (EU).  It had decided in 
1993 that Cyprus was eligible for membership in spite of objections from Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership.3  On December 13, 1997, at the Luxembourg European Council, the 
EU member states decided Cyprus could begin the formal process of negotiating the conditions 
of its membership but rejected Turkey’s application for membership (Eralp and Beriker 2005).  
Two years later, Greece lifted its veto of Turkey’s European Union (EU) candidacy at the 
European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 following the rapid improvement of 
relations with Turkey after the August 1999 earthquakes. The positive climate between Greece 
and Turkey as well as the prospect of European enlargement in the Eastern Mediterranean 
including Turkey came to be widely seen as potential catalysts for a settlement in Cyprus and 
provided the background that gave rise to the UN’s (Annan Plan) initiative that began in 2001 
(Rumelili 2007).  
 
EU accession promised clear benefits for both communities on the island.  For the Turkish 
Cypriots, it offered access to a huge market and other economic opportunities that were 
unimaginable under their status quo of diplomatic, legal and economic isolation.  The inclusion 
of a united Cyprus in European institutions also offered protections against Greek Cypriot 
majoritarianism, including by shifting significant responsibilities from Nicosia to Brussels, 
although this benefit was perceived more clearly by political elites than the public.  The result 
was a re-alignment of political cleavages amongst Turkish Cypriots that weakened the veteran 
rejectionist Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş and the main right-wing political party UBP 
(National Unity Party). Pro-EU Turkish Cypriots led by Mehmet Ali Talat’s CTP (Republican 
Turkish Party) put forward a successful pro-unification campaign that produced, taking into 
consideration the size of the Turkish Cypriot community, some of the most impressive pro-EU 
rallies in modern European history. As a result, in December 2003, the CTP became the main 
coalition party in the North with DP (Democratic Party) as its junior partner. While the latter was 
associated with Denktaş’s legacy, it significantly moderated its position during this period.  
 
Accession was also a long-term demand of Greek Cypriots who saw it not just as economically 
beneficial, but as strengthening Cyprus’s political and diplomatic clout, providing protection 
from Turkey, and strengthening links with Greece, which was already a member.  Greek Cypriot 
political  elites also saw a shift of responsibilities to Brussels as reducing the risks of Turkish 
Cypriot obstructionism within Cyprus’s common government.  When the UN initiative started, 
the largest Greek Cypriot party, DISY (Democratic Rally), representing one-third or more of 
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Greek Cypriots, supported the settlement process under its leader Nicos Anastasiades, in spite of 
its links to the Greek ethno-nationalist tradition and the enosis movement. DISY’s founder, and 
President of Cyprus (1993-2003), Glafkos Clerides, was committed to the prospect of 
Europeanization and campaigned successfully among right-wing voters for a “federal Cyprus 
within a federal Europe” (Fokaides, 2014). The second largest Greek Cypriot party, AKEL 
(Progressive Party of Working People), also roughly representing one-third of voters, was also 
pro-settlement.  The remaining third of Greek Cypriot voters supported two smaller parties, 
DIKO (Democratic Party) and EDEK (Movement for Social Democracy).  Hardliners 
traditionally voted for these last two parties, but in the period preceding EU accession both of 
them had moderated their positions. The first version of the plan in 2002 was endorsed by all 
Greek Cypriot parties as the basis for negotiations (at a minimum), a surprising development 
given what happened subsequently.    
 
Although it was not immediately apparent, this promising domestic situation changed 
substantially after the EU’s decision at the Copenhagen summit of 2002 to allow the Greek 
Cypriots (i.e., the Republic of Cyprus) but not the Turkish Cypriots, to accede to the EU without 
a settlement.  This decision came after Greece threatened to veto the entire eastern enlargement 
of the EU unless it happened.  Athens and Nicosia also argued that making Cyprus’s accession 
(i.e. the accession of the government-controlled areas) dependent on a settlement would 
effectively provide Turkey (which, in the Greek narrative, had invaded and occupied Cyprus) 
with a veto over that accession, as it could insist on its positions being met if there was to be a 
settlement. The EU’s decision meant that Greek Cypriots were guaranteed EU membership 
regardless of which way they voted on the UN’s plan. Its actions did not just remove a 
substantial incentive for the Greek Cypriots to vote ‘yes’, but as negotiations continued in 2003-
4, provided an incentive to vote ‘no’.  This was because post-accession, the Republic of Cyprus 
would acquire a veto over Turkey’s accession as well as that of the Turkish Cypriots. This, it was 
thought, would strengthen Cyprus’s position in subsequent negotiations.   
 
In the wake of the decision, AKEL, fearing that the decision would allow DISY to once more 
win the presidency of Cyprus in elections in 2003, formed a coalition with the traditionally anti-
settlement leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, for president. The victorious President Papadopoulos 
initially kept negotiating on the basis of the UN’s plan for a year but concealed the intensity of 
his opposition to it.   He eventually emerged to reject a settlement, leading the ‘no’ campaign in 
the referendum.  In a tearful televised pre-referendum speech, he laid out the significance of the 
EU’s decision for Greek Cypriot voters in the referendum:   
 
“If the sovereign people reject the Plan by their vote, the Republic of Cyprus will become a full and equal 
member of the European Union.  We would have achieved the strategic goal we have jointly set, i.e. to 
upgrade and shield politically the Republic of Cyprus…Shall we do away with our internationally 
recognized state [a reference to his argument that the Annan Plan had abolished the Republic of Cyprus] 
exactly at the very moment it strengthens its political weight, with its accession to the European Union?”  
(Papadopoulos 2004).     
 
AKEL at first hesitated to join Papadopoulos, but followed him in a last-minute decision, which 
helped to shape the referendum’s devastating outcome (Trimikliniotis, 2006).4 The UN’s 
inability to control the EU’s accession process meant that: i) an opportunity to incentivize the 
Greek Cypriots to vote “yes” to a settlement was lost; ii) Greek Cypriots were instead provided 
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with an incentive to vote “no”, and; iii) the politics surrounding the European Council’s decision 
in 2002 contributed to a political environment in the Greek Cypriot community, with a 
rejectionist elected President,  that made an affirmative vote much less likely.  This set of 
developments was primarily the EU’s responsibility, but the UN was unable to prevent it, or to 
co-ordinate its actions with the EU,5 and it insisted on going ahead with referendums in spite of 
this. 
 
The EU’s decision strengthened the Greek Cypriots’ position in the negotiations and vis-à-vis 
Turkey.  But the UN made a Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan more likely by shifting post-
Copenhagen to versions of the Annan plan that arguably leaned more towards Turkey (Palley 
2005).6  In particular, the version of the UN’s plan that was put to referendum fell short of Greek 
Cypriot objectives, and, arguably, evenhandedness, on security, perhaps the most fundamental of 
all the issues in the negotiations (Faustmann 2004; McGarry 2020a). A core objective of the 
Greek Cypriot public and their political leadership related to the withdrawal of Turkish troops 
from Cyprus and an end to Turkey’s intervention rights under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.  
The latter had been opposed by Greek Cypriots from the time of independence because it was 
inconsistent with any normal conception of state sovereignty.  Their opposition to it was 
reinforced by the fact that it was used as the legal basis for what Turkey described as its 
‘intervention’ or ‘peace operation’ in 1974, but which Greek Cypriots saw as an invasion and 
occupation that had partitioned their homeland and produced the expulsion of a third of their 
community from the north. The version of the UN’s plan that was put to referendum allowed the 
Treaty of Guarantee to remain in place without significant changes. Provisions that applied the 
Treaty to both constituent states, as well as to Cyprus as a whole, were seen on the Greek Cypriot 
side as an extension of its provisions (Annan Plan, 2004, Art. 8.1 (a)).7  While Turkey 
compromised by agreeing to reduce the number of troops it had introduced in 1974,  this was to 
take place over fourteen years.  In contrast, the plan’s power-sharing and federal institutions 
were to come into place right away.8  A 650-strong Turkish troop contingent permitted under the 
1960 Treaty of Alliance was to be allowed to remain until Turkey decided otherwise, along with 
950 Greek troops (Annan Plan, 2004, Art. 8.1. (b) (iii)).9  The plan also lacked a credible security 
implementation framework.  There was to be no robust impartial overseer. The guarantor powers 
themselves (Turkey, Greece and the UK) were to be involved in the monitoring of the plan’s 
implementation, including its demilitarization provisions, while strong mechanisms for securing 
compliance, or even verification, were lacking (Coufoudakis and Kyriakides 2004: pp.38-40).10  
This problem was fully exploited by the rejectionist Papadopoulos, who warned the Greek 
Cypriots that Turkey was bound to renege on demilitarisation and other commitments (Loizides 
2004). Just as the EU’s decision at Copenhagen suggested the limits of the UN’s ability to 
control it, the security provisions of the plan suggested the limits of its ability to influence or 
incentivize Turkey, a major regional power that was a member of NATO and a close ally of two 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United States and United Kingdom. Both of 
these latter countries were actively involved in the background of the Cyprus talks via envoys, 
Thomas Weston and David Hannay, respectively, and the UN’s position may have been affected 
by their influence (Palley 2005). 
 
 
The UN’s inability to shape the incentives of local parties or control the actions of externals was 
then exacerbated  by a decision to go beyond its role as a mediator and to act as a “meditrator”, 
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i.e. in a manner between mediation and arbitration (Ker-Lindsay 2009).  This decision was taken 
on 13 February 2004 in the face of the inability of the sides to agree on important questions, 
including on security. The UN Secretary-General agreed to use his “discretion” to finalize the 
text in the event of  “a continuing and persistent deadlock” (S/2004/437 Annex I). A decision to 
meditrate  would have made more sense if the UN had been in a position to impose its 
preferences, but it was not.  The Greek Cypriots were now, because of the EU’s decision in 
Copenhagen, in a stronger position to reject UN terms they did not like.  The decision to finalize 
the text, moreover, was taken in a political culture where Greek Cypriot elites had long railed 
against external interference in their affairs, including during the process that led to the 1960 
Constitution, which they saw as imposed on them by outsiders, primarily the United Kingdom, 
Turkey and Greece, and, of course, during the events of 1974.  The UN’s decision to meditrate 
also happened while the Greek Cypriots were led by a rejectionist president, Papadopoulos, 
although the extent of his opposition was not completely clear at the time the decision was made. 
It allowed Papadopoulos the strong political ground of posing as a patriot against outside 
organizations in hock to great powers.11  The final decision on the plan was to be made by the 
two communities, voting in twin referendums, and the Greek Cypriot leadership was in a much 
better position to sway its people than the UN was. During the referendum campaign, the UN 
SASG, Alvaro de Soto, requested air time on Greek Cypriot television to counter what he saw as 
distortions by the Greek Cypriot leadership.  His request was turned down, but it is doubtful it 
would have made any difference.12  
 
The UN’s handling of the negotiations was far from unreasonable overall.  In particular, while 
the plan’s provisions on security were arguably not even-handed, its provisions on the core issue 
of governance (power-sharing) were balanced and useful, though not entirely without 
weaknesses.13  The plan called for a Swiss-style, six person (4 GC/2 TC) presidential council in 
which a representative of the larger constituent state (likely a Greek Cypriot) would serve as a 
symbolic president for two-thirds of each term, with a representative of the smaller constituent 
state (likely a Turkish Cypriot) serving for the remaining one third.   This solution neatly split the 
difference between the Greek Cypriot demand for a single president elected by the majority and 
the Turkish Cypriot demand for co-presidents.  The council also provided for the possibility of 
politically diverse representation within each community, which could enable cross-communal 
alliances, particularly likely on the left.14 This had potentially significant advantages over the 
1960 constitution in which each community was represented as a political monolith, with a 
Greek Cypriot President and Turkish Cypriot Vice-president.   
 
Unlike its security proposals, the UN’s power-sharing proposals, which resulted from bringing 
international expertise to bear on a difficult problem, were accepted by both sides.15  This 
suggests that UN mediation can be useful, in spite of the overall failure of the Annan plan.  It 
also suggests the feasibility of an overarching compromise that combines power-sharing (and 
federalism), with provisions that address Greek Cypriot concerns on other matters, particularly 
on security. Such a compromise would bring Cyprus more into line with other peace processes 
such as in Northern Ireland (the Good Friday Agreement) and Bosnia-Hercegovina (the Dayton 
Peace Accords).   In both of these latter cases, the largest communities (unionists and Bosniaks) 
were asked to accept power-sharing (and federalism in Bosnia), in return for internationally-
backed security guarantees, and in the Bosnian case, concessions on property restitution and the 





2.  ‘Mediation-lite’ and the resumption of the Cyprus talks in 2008  
 
The negative outcome of the Annan Plan referendum was decisive for the foreseeable future of 
Cyprus mediations.  The UN was chastened and became determined to avoid ‘meditration’.  It 
moved reactively towards what can be described as ‘mediation-lite’, a form of mediation that 
was, in any case, insisted on by the leaders of both communities. Mediation-lite involved the UN 
chairing meetings on neutral territory (the UN compound in Cyprus’s “Buffer Zone”), conveying 
proposals from one side to the other, orally commenting on each sides’ proposals, maintaining a 
record of the sides’ positions and convergences, offering international expertise to the sides 
through its consultants and those from other international organizations, including the European 
Union and World Bank, as well as promoting Track II activities and suggesting confidence-
building measures. It did not include the UN offering its own written proposals on either 
substance or process.16  This formula had the advantage of ruling out the approach that had 
backfired in 2004 and it added legitimacy to the talks.  On the other hand, it was far from a 
panacea, as progress continued to require agreement among the parties, and this remained 
dependent on local politics and the balance of power between the sides.   
 
Local politics eventually permitted the resumption of negotiations in September 2008 after 
moderate leaders were elected in each community -  CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat as the 
TRNC’s president in 2006 and AKEL leader Demetris Christofias as president of the Republic of 
Cyprus in 2008.  The negotiations were again held under the UN’s auspices, but with a clear 
understanding that this time the process would be “Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned” (Michalis 
2013; Xypolia 2017).  During the first phase of the talks (2008-11), and indeed right up until 
2015-16, the sides opted for a negotiations process that might reasonably be described as 
“sequential”, i.e. some matters were to be discussed initially while others, particularly the issue 
of territorial adjustment between the two zones and the key issue of security (which would 
include the guarantor powers in the negotiations for the first time), were to be left until towards 
the end.  To facilitate progress along these lines, the talks were also governed by the overriding 
principle that “nothing was agreed until everything was agreed”. The thinking behind 
sequentialism was that progress on matters discussed at the beginning would facilitate the 
resolution of issues discussed subsequently, but this process came to suffer from two problems.  
First, progress on the early matters was slow, with a focus on details.  There was insufficient 
awareness of the unusual opportunity presented by the presence of moderate leaders on both 
sides (the first time this had happened in Cyprus’s history) and the need to take advantage of this. 
Second and relatedly, instead of facilitating compromise, the sequential process created 
obstacles.  This was because the side that compromised first had to do so visibly in return for a 
later trade-off, but without that trade-off being guaranteed or visible to the compromising side’s 
supporters.17   
 
The post-2008 talks were broken down into six “chapters” on governance (power-sharing, 
federalism, citizenship, and sovereignty-related constitutional provisions), security, property, 
territorial adjustment, the economy, and the EU.  But the talks initially focused more or less 
exclusively on governance and the relatively uncontroversial matters of the EU and economy 
(S/2010/238 para. 12).  Christofias courageously committed early on to the compromise of a 
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“rotating” dual executive presidency in which the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot members 
would serve for two-thirds and one third of each term, respectively. This abandoned the Annan 
Plan’s promising proposal for a parliamentary and collegial executive (the ‘presidential 
council’), which, unfortunately, was seriously tainted by its association with “meditration”.  In 
January of 2010, the two leaders made an important breakthrough on how to elect a rotating 
presidency.  This was to involve direct elections, as in the 1960 Constitution but unlike the 
Annan Plan.  While the 1960 Constitution had stipulated direct elections based on separate 
communal rolls (i.e. with Greek Cypriots electing the president and Turkish Cypriots the vice-
president), the new agreement called for partly integrated elections based on “weighted cross-
voting”.   Each Cypriot was to have two votes.  The Greek Cypriot member of the presidency 
would be elected by a constituency that was 80% Greek Cypriot and 20% Turkish Cypriot 
(approximately the actual demographic ratio on the island), while the Turkish Cypriot member 
would be elected by a constituency that was 80% Turkish Cypriot and 20% Greek Cypriot.18  By 
incentivizing rival candidates in each community to reach out for some votes in the other 
community, this electoral system had what political scientists call a “centripetal” dimension.19 It 
provided an obvious advantage to moderate politicians, as they would be most likely to be 
willing and able to make plausible cross-community appeals. The Cyprus “weighted cross-
voting” formula had been pioneered by Costa Carras and the Friends of Cyprus as early as the 
1970s.20 It was not a UN initiative. 
 
Under the Christofias-Talat agreement, the Greek Cypriot member of the presidency would serve 
as president for two thirds of each term and the Turkish Cypriot for one third, with each serving 
as vice-president when not president.   This was similar to the Annan Plan, which had provided 
for a rotating two-person presidency to be drawn from its presidential council, although the 
presidency in the Annan Plan was symbolic.  While the agreement on rotation represented a 
major concession from Christofias in advance of reciprocal concessions from the Turkish 
Cypriot side, the integrated electoral formula was more in keeping with traditional Greek Cypriot 
thinking. Communal elections, in the Greek Cypriots’ view, played to the advantage of Turkish 
Cypriot partitionists by suggesting two separate peoples.   
 
The Achilles heel of the 2010 power-sharing (executive) agreement, which led to the end of the  
Christofias-Talat negotiations, was something endemic to centripetal electoral institutions.  As 
these advantage moderate politicians, they require moderate politicians to occupy key positions 
in negotiations if they are to be agreed to, or even tabled (McGarry and Loizides 2015). This 
condition was satisfied by the presence of Christofias and Talat atop their respective 
communities.  The problem, though, was that Talat faced re-election in early 2011. His 
opponents in the Turkish Cypriot community were hardline nationalists.  These were opposed to 
a settlement to begin with, but their opposition to “weighted cross-voting” was particularly 
intense given that it was designed to marginalize them politically in a reunited Cyprus.  Talat’s 
two leading opponents in the Turkish Cypriot community, Dervis Eroglu of the UBP and Serdar 
Denktash of the Democratic party, formed an electoral pact to defeat him, and in an election 
campaign that was dominated by weighted cross voting, Talat lost to Eroglu. Weighted cross-
voting was also criticized in the Greek Cypriot community, but mainly from the right wing and 
because it seemed from its perspective to suggest political opportunism on Christofias’s part.  
Averoff Neophytou, the deputy head of DISY, claimed that the electoral arrangement was 




Talat’s defeat and the effective end of this phase of the negotiations was arguably also 
contributed to by the “sequential” process that governed the negotiations from 2008, coupled 
with the slow, “Cyprus-led, Cyprus-owned” nature of progress. Christofias had been criticized 
from the right within his community for conceding the key prize (for Turkish Cypriots) of a 
rotating presidency without receiving commensurate concessions on issues of importance to 
Greek Cypriots, such as property and refugees, territorial adjustment, and, particularly, 
security.22 When, during his election campaign, Talat called for Christofias to indicate they could 
achieve a settlement, his interlocutor felt unable to oblige because of his own political 
exposure.23 As a result the opportunity provided by having two moderate leaders each 
representing constituencies committed to a settlement was squandered. Described by Talat as 
‘ambivalent’, Christofias opted to prioritize his own alliance with two Greek Cypriot hardline 
parties, DIKO and EDEK.  Following Papadopoulos’ failure to qualify for the second round in 
2008, these two parties had offered conditional support for AKEL’s leader. Christofias was the 
first ever leader of the communist party to be elected to the presidency of the Republic and he 
knew that in the absence of allies, DISY could dominate Greek Cypriot politics.   
 
The election of the hardliner Eroglu did not stop the negotiations but it effectively stopped 
progress during his tenure (2011-15), apart from a “Joint Declaration” in February 2014 that 
resolved a number of important sovereignty issues.24 The Joint Declaration was driven on the 
Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side by Ankara, not by Eroglu.25  Otherwise, the talks between Eroglu 
and Christofias, and then between Eroglu and Christofias’s successor, Nicos Anastassiades,  
involved little but unproductive conflicts over the ‘sequential’ process.  Eroglu wanted to 
prioritise issues where the Turkish Cypriots stood to gain, and wanted in particular to avoid 
discussions on territorial adjustment until the end of the process, on the argument that this would 
traumatize the affected residents (likely to be Turkish Cypriots) and should only be engaged in 
when an end was in sight.  Security was to be left to the very end.  Anastassiades, in contrast, 
pressed to prioritise issues where the Greek Cypriots were expected to make gains, including 
property, territorial adjustment, and security.  In line with his criticism of Christofias’s premature 
offer of a rotating presidency, Anastassiades withdrew that concession. There was no progress 
until local politics intervened once more and Eroglu was defeated in April of 2015 by the 
independent moderate, Mustafa Akinci.  Akinci was a politician who seemed completely 
committed to a balanced settlement of the Cyprus conflict, at least as much as Talat. 
 
3. Back to Conventional Mediation: The Road to Crans Montana and Beyond  
 
The obvious limitations of both meditration and mediation-lite eventually forced the sides in the 
Cyprus peace talks to seek a more balanced approach in the involvement of third parties in the 
negotiations.  The UN Good Offices Team, under a new Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, 
pushed from 2015 for the sequential process to be replaced by a more integrated one, involving 
negotiations across chapters (S/2016/15 para. 2).  The Greek Cypriots, it was clear, were not 
prepared to consider substantive compromises on governance, unless they knew what they were 
going to receive on property, territorial adjustment, and, particularly, on security. The remainder 
of 2015 and 2016 was taken up with increasingly intensive discussions involving the chapters on 
governance and property, but also the less controversial chapters of the EU and the Economy.  
Progress on the latter two was facilitated by the UN’s ability to call in other international 
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organizations, particularly the EU, International Monetary Fund and World Bank to lend expert 
assistance to the sides (S/2017/814 para. 34). By late 2016 and early 2017, negotiations were 
taking place on all chapters, including preliminary discussions on territory and security 
(S/2017/814 para. 11-13). 
 
Substantive negotiations on security necessarily included the guarantor powers (in addition to the 
two sides), as they were signatories to the treaties that were being discussed (The Treaty of 
Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance).  Talks at Geneva in January 2017, under the auspices of 
UN Secretary General Guterres, and involving the guarantors and leaders of the two 
communities, reached agreement on the need to find “mutually acceptable solutions on security 
and guarantees that address the concerns of both communities” with all parties recognizing that 
“the security of one community cannot come at the expense of the security of the other” 
(S/2017/814 para.14).26 Arguably, this was not an understanding that had informed the Annan 
Plan.  It paved the way for a ‘final’ Conference on Cyprus, held at Crans-Montana in June-July 
2017. To facilitate the novel “cross-chapter” approach to the talks, the parties, including the 
guarantors, were to meet, alternately, in a “two table” format (S/2017/814 para.18). One of these 
tables, involving the leaders of the two communities, would discuss the core outstanding 
domestic issues - primarily governance, property, and territorial adjustment territory – while the 
other, which included the community leaders and the guarantors, would discuss security. This 
format allowed for trade-offs between the issues discussed at each of the tables.   
 
The Crans-Montana Conference was also guided by UN Secretary General Guterres who used 
his personality and the prestige of his office to engage in a more robust mediation than had been 
attempted by his predecessor, Ban Ki-moon, while also carefully steering clear of “meditration”. 
At the outset of the conference, Guterres announced that in his view the parties needed to reach a 
strategic (framework) agreement across the core issues. This was intended to skip discussions on 
minutiae, which could be left until later, thus avoiding the difficulties that had pervaded the 
negotiations from 2008 to 2015, when matters had become bogged down. Guterres also 
structured the conference by issuing the “Guterres Framework”, a short list of key issues, 
agreement on which would pave the way for a comprehensive settlement, and put the parties on a 
“path of no return”. All aspects of Guterres’s framework were important, but the key implied 
trade-off involved concessions from the Greek Cypriots on “political equality” (a key part of the 
governance chapter that included a rotating presidency and “effective participation” by both 
communities) in return for Turkish and Turkish Cypriot concessions on security (the Treaty of 
Guarantee, presence of the Turkish army, and a robust implementation mechanism). Guterres’s 
framework, in other words, was aimed at retaining the most positive part of the Annan Plan for 
Turkish Cypriots (its balanced compromise on governance, though not its exact details) while 
substantially improving on its security dimension for Greek Cypriots (through a balanced 
resolution on security).  Towards this latter end, the Secretary-General importantly proposed that 
the current system of guarantees, and in particular Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee 
containing the unilateral right of intervention, was “unsustainable”, and also that there needed to 
be a “credible framework for monitoring implementation of the agreement” (S/2017/814 para 
24). To facilitate discussion, he introduced a UN-produced blueprint – an implementation 
monitoring mechanism – that would replace the Treaty of Guarantee.  Unlike under meditration, 
Guterres’s blueprint needed buy in from the parties – like the Guterres Package as a whole – but 
in the event it was not negotiated in the necessary depth.   
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Despite Guterres’s skilful mediation, agreement on his package proved to be elusive, with the 
conference breaking down acrimoniously in the early morning of July 7.27   In his report on the 
Crans-Montana Conference to the Security Council, Guterres correctly ascribed the breakdown 
to a lack of will, and specifically to a lack of “trust and determination necessary to seek common 
ground through mutual accommodation” (S/2017/814 para 26).  He declared that the parties had 
missed an “historic opportunity”.  By the end of the Conference, there had been “practically full 
agreement” on the federal executive and effective participation (S/2017/814 para 21); the sides 
had went further “than ever before” on the territory chapter, agreeing on a rough territorial 
demarcation, with only details left (S/2017/814 para 10); they also “left little outstanding with 
respect to an overarching property settlement framework” (S/2017/814 para 22).  There had also 
been significant progress on the security file, as noted.  The Secretary-General concluded overall 
that “the essence of a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem is practically there” 
(S/2017/814 para 45). 
The period since Crans-Montana has produced further tensions, primarily around exploration for 
hydrocarbons, and then the closing of crossings related to the Covid-19 crisis.  In spite of this, 
Akinci and Anastasiades agreed in a meeting with Guterres in Berlin in November 2019 that they 
remained committed to resuming negotiations based on the Guterres Framework, 28 implying a 
conditional/tentative endorsement of it. This resumption was held up by the Covid-19 crisis, 
which forced the cancellation of the election for the Turkish Cypriot leadership, originally 
scheduled for April 2020, until October 2020.  At that election, however, local politics again 
intervened to erect possible obstacles to progress.  Akinci was defeated by a hardliner, Ersin 
Tatar, the leader of Eroglu’s party, and his heir in the Cyprus negotiations.  Tatar’s public 
positions, which, like Eroglu’s, include support for a two state solution, and the maintenance of 
the Treaty of Guarantee, seem incompatible with progress in negotiations.     
 
As this article has made clear, UN mediation in Cyprus over the past two decades has often been 
hostage to local politics within each community, with the UN able to make progress when 
political moderates are ascendant, but not when hardliners are. But local politics within the 
communities take place alongside a broader power-relationship between the sides.  A rough 
balance of power independently helps to account for the limited progress of UN mediation over 
the years, including when both communities had moderate leaders.   While Greek Cypriots have 
had clear incentives to compromise with Turkish Cypriots and Turkey since 1974 (e.g. they 
would be able to reunite their homeland and reduce or eliminate Turkey’s armed presence), they 
are quite clearly in a position where they have not felt compelled to accept the terms that were 
offered to them.  This bargaining strength, in which the status quo is seen as preferable to the 
deal on offer, derives from the fact that Greek Cypriots control the state of Cyprus, which has 
helped them to prevent the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, simply by 
opposing it.  Statehood was also a prerequisite for the accession of the government- (i.e., Greek-
Cypriot-) controlled part of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, which increased the ability of Greek 
Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan and continues to enable them to resist positions seen as 
inimical to their interests.  Although the EU would like the Greek Cypriots to reach an 
agreement, and to remove Turkey’s troops from a part of the EU’s territory, it has limited ability 
to pressure the Greek Cypriots to settle, given that Cyprus, and Greece, are members.  Greek 
Cypriot-controlled Cyprus has also prospered economically, and by 2018 ranked fifteenth in 
GDP per capita among the EU’s 28 states (IMF 2019).  While Turkey’s partition and stationing 
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of a large number of troops in northern Cyprus has introduced a profound security threat, the 
partition has also, ironically, helped to maintain peace between the two communities by sealing 
them off from each other. There is no realistic threat of Turkey’s army moving further against 
the Greek Cypriots, not just because UN peacekeepers stand in its way, but because such an 
action would be extraordinarily difficult to justify.   
 
The status quo is not quite as comfortable for Turkish Cypriots, who remain relatively deprived 
and internationally isolated. But the Turkish Cypriots also benefit from the absence of violent 
conflict and are protected economically by significant subsidies from Ankara. Even if Turkish 
Cypriots were prepared to accept terms that the Greek Cypriots are prepared to offer, a 
settlement, and particularly its security aspects, also requires the assent of Turkey. The difficulty 
here is that Turkey is the regional hegemon, an important economic power with the second-
largest army in NATO and in a complex relationship with two veto-wielding allies on the UN 
Security Council (the U.S. and the U.K.). Turkey also hosts the largest refugee population in the 
world and has been involved in numerous crises in the region that makes in its eyes any 
confrontation very costly for the EU and other external actors; therefore it does not seem to feel 
that it has to give Greek Cypriots what they want. At the same time, the Republic of Cyprus and 
Greece  are both members of the EU and given the strength of their legal case and political 
position, the UN cannot enter into a confrontation with them, risking its own interests within the 
EU system.  
 
This rough balance of power – or stand-off -  between the two sides has made UN mediation 
extraordinarily difficult, regardless of whether it is meditration, mediation-lite, or conventional 
mediation that is employed. It has meant that the motivation to settle on the terms available from 
the other side is not there (Susskind and Babbitt 1996), and the UN has been unable to change 
either side’s calculus. Under these circumtances, meditration, particularly strict deadlines, 
coercive diplomacy and threats of sanctions can backfire, while a return to mediation-lite 
interventions in the post-Crans Montana period would appear pointless. Conventional mediation 





Regardless of their shortcomings, the two archetypes analysed here - meditration vs. mediation-
lite - offer an analytically important distinction on how third parties engage in protracted conflict 
mediations. At a minimum, the distinction suggests options that mediators and domestic parties 
can discuss and plan for ahead of future peace talks. Mediation can be made more effective if the 
merits and de-merits of the different approaches are discussed beforehand, and the expectations 
and concerns of the different parties are addressed.  The case of Cyprus offers a blueprint where 
in a single case study,  each approach has been employed back to back making their rationale and 
limitations clearer.  
 
In spite of its lack of success in Cyprus to date, the UN’s role has also brought some important 
benefits.  The engagement of the UN’s Good Offices and its peacekeepers have helped to 
maintain peace in the island while in the negotiations, the UN has often used its limited capacity 
in productive ways.  Even without the ability to ‘force’ or  ‘reward’, the UN has used its 
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‘expertise’ and ‘legitimacy’ to encourage progress (Rubin 1992; Iji 2017: 92-93).  UN experts 
have helped construct important advances, including the governance proposals in the Annan Plan 
and the sovereignty proposals in the Joint Declaration of February 2014.  UN Secretary-General 
Guterres shrewdly used the legitimacy of his office, and his grasp of the need for balance across 
a basket of core issues, to help bring the sides closer to an agreement in Crans-Montana in 2017 
than ever before, even if the effort ultimately failed.   
 
The UN has also contributed in Cyprus in other ways that are mostly unsung. This includes its 
role in developing a number of proto-federal structures through various (largely) bicommunal 
projects, associations and committees actively working to end the long stalemate. The most 
notable of these include the Committee for Missing Persons responsible for exhuming the 
missing from the 1963-1974 violence, the Committee on Cultural Heritage for the restoration of 
ancient monuments including mosques, churches and monasteries, as well as committees on 
gender, education, policing and crisis management that aim for, and provide the basis for,  
cooperation during emergencies.29 Other key initiatives are supported by embassies and foreign 
governments but in close partnership with the UN, e.g.,  the religious track of the Cyprus peace 
process (Sweden), the PRIO Cyprus Centre (Norway), the Cyprus Academic Dialogue 
(Australia) and the Cypriot political parties bicommunal forum (Slovakia). Finally, the UN is the 
custodian of the Green Line and through its Cyprus mission enables contacts between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Since the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 more than 40 million crossings 
have taken place and despite the division those contacts have been peaceful.  Related surveys 
have shown that intergroup contact in Cyprus reduces prejudice and is associated with increased 
willingness for cohabitation and opposition to partition (see for instance, Psaltis et al. 2019). 
There is more that can be done on this front.   
 
While capable of alternating its mediation and facilitation roles, the UN is not in a position, 
outside of resolve and unity on the Security Council, to force parties to settle their differences or 
even to induce them to do so through direct incentives.  It is also not able to control the actions 
of third parties who may be in a position to compel or induce a settlement, or prevent one.  It 
depends for progress not just on its legitimacy and expertise, but on the balance of power 
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1 For exceptions see Rubin 1992 and Iji 2017 
2 See also special symposium contributions on the emergence of meditration in international peacekeeping by 
Belloni (2009), Yiakinthou (2009), Noel (2009) and Weller (2009) 
3 For a discussion of the main milestones leading to EU accession see James Ker-Lindsay 2012.   
4 There is an argument put forward by Greece that it was entirely appropriate to allow the Republic of Cyprus 
accession prior to a settlement, because if this did not happen, it would effectively hand an unfair veto over Cyprus’s 
accession to the invader, Turkey.  In this view, Turkey, either independently given its status as a signatory of the 
Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, or because of its influence over Turkish Cypriots, would be in a position to 
insist on its terms for a settlement  before Cyprus’s accession to the EU could be obtained. Our argument makes no 
judgement on Greece’s position but merely points out that the incentive structure it created facilitated rejection of 
the Plan by Greek Cypriots. 
5  For a discussion of the difficulties caused by the failure of multiple intermediaries to coordinate their approaches 
to peacemaking, see Kriesberg 1996. 
6 Palley’s is a Hellenophile account that focuses exclusively on the argument that the UN, influenced by the U.S. and 
U.K., was biased towards Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.  She omits any consideration of the responsibility of the 
Greek Cypriot leader, Papadopoulos, for the plan’s defeat, or of the role played by the EU in making failure more 
likely. 
7 This claim was made by, among others, Coufoudakis and Kyriakides 2004: p.32.  
8 Had the Plan been approved, the first elections would have taken place on 13th of June 2004 
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_April2004.pdf  p:11. In the meantime, the two sides had to 
“provide to the Secretary-General no later than two days after successful referenda the names of the transitional Co-
Presidents, the transitional Council of Ministers, and the Cypriot members of the Supreme Court, and otherwise 
accept any indispensable suggestions of the Secretary-General or his representative.” 
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/AppendixF/MEASURES_TO_BE_TAKEN_DURING_APRIL_2004.pdf 
9 The 950 Greek troops were also to be permitted to stay. 
10 Nathalie Tocci reports that 80 per cent of Greek Cypriot “no” voters rejected the plan “out of fear that Turkey 





questions asked (Were the respondents given certain choices, or asked to state their own reasons for voting no?), 
size of the survey, and so on (Tocci, 2004, p. 42). 
11  This was a position spread by one of his advisers. See Palley 2005. 
12 Makarios Drousiotis, “Accusations for Inspections and Pressure in Favor of ‘No’, Politis 18/02/2004 available at  
http://www.makarios.eu/cgibin/hweb?-A=216,printer.html&-V=makarios.  According to Drousiotis both Alvaro De 
Seto and his legal Didier Pfirter were censored by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CYBC).  
13 The council was to be elected from a single list by a “special majority”, i.e. a majority in the House of 
Representatives and a majority in the Senate that included at least two-fifths of Senators from each constituent state.   
These provisions for a special majority were designed to help political moderates but opened up the possibility of 
long haggling on executive formation such as that which took place in Belgium in 2010-11, when it took 589 days to 
form a government.  It also raised the possibility that no list would surpass the special majority threshold (e.g. one 
list might satisfy the 2/5 support threshold among Turkish Cypriot Senators but not Greek Cypriot Senators, or vice-
versa), which would mean that a default rule would be necessary.   
14 By moving away from a directly elected presidential executive towards a parliamentary version, the plan was 
more closely in line with what is recommended by consociationalists (see Lijphart, 1994 and esp. Linz 1990 as well 
as Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; McGarry, 2013). 
15 Annan reported to the Security Council that the presidential council was “broadly accepted” by the parties to the 
negotiations, and was “one of the least contentious issues in the discussions which followed the 
presentation of the plan” (United Nations, 2003, para 23). Lordos found that these provisions on  power-sharing 
had no influence on the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the plan: “it was the only aspect of the Annan Plan that did not 
contribute to the No vote.”  Personal email correspondence with Alexandros Lordos with the first author. Similarly, 
a 2019-2020 conjoint experiment confirms this observation. Alternative power-sharing arrangements made little 
difference in changing public support compared to security, territory or compensation (Loizides et al. 2020).  
16  The first author was a consultant to the UN Secretary General’s Good Offices in Cyprus throughout this period. 
17 While the talks were in principle confidential, in practice they were not. 
18 While the details were not worked out, presumably a mathematical formula would have been applied to adjust the 
‘minority’ vote in each constituency to a weight of 20 per cent.  
19 Centripetalism is the term given to the approach associated with the eminent political scientist, Donald Horowitz, 
in which electoral systems are designed to favour moderate politicians and which have, in his view, a “centripetal” 
effect on the political system (Horowitz 1985; 1991). The basic idea is that ethnic politicians will moderate if, to get 
elected in a divided society, they need to depend on votes of communities rival to their own. Horowitz himself did 
not endorse the Cypriot version of centripetalism pointing instead to the Indonesian alternative.  
20 Cross-voting or weighted-voting has a long history in the island and is arguably the most innovative idea 
produced in bicommunal workshops in recent decades. Costa Carras and the London-based Friends of Cyprus have 
lobbied for such arrangements since the late 1970s. References to cross-voting were also included in the Greek 
Cypriot proposals of 1989. See also Loizides & Keskiner (2004) 
21 ‘Resigning is Christofias’s Only Option’, Phileleftheros, 4 September, 2011.  AKEL regularly defended rotating 
presidency with cross-voting.   DISY generally refrained from discussing the issue but DIKO rejected political 
equality and clearly drew ‘a red line on the issue’ Minutes of the House of Representatives IA Parliamentary Period, 
Session A, Special Meeting 18th of November 2016 
22 Savvas Ioacovides “The Minutes for Rotating Presidency and a Secret Agreeement”. Simerini 28/2/2020 
avalailble at http://christofias-watch.blogspot.com/2010/02/  As the name of Christofias-Watch implies the Greek 
Cypriot leader had to face a vicious opposition to any new deal with the Turkish Cypriot leader. 
23 “Talks failed due to Christofias, Talat says” Hurriyet September 25 2012.  
https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/talks-failed-due-to-christofias-talat-says-30892 





27 While Guterres was more assertive than his predecessor Ban had ever been, he arguably made two mistakes.  





and did not return until July 6.  Second, he declared the talks over on the morning of July 7, shortly after he 
returned.  His presence during the talks, or greater persistence after July 6th-7th ‘may’ have helped to prevent such 
a negative outcome.   
28 Accordingly “The Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader affirmed their commitment to the Joint 
Declaration of 11 February 2014, the prior convergences, and the six point framework I presented on 30 June 2017 
with a view to achieve a strategic agreement paving the way forward for a comprehensive settlement.” 
http://www.uncyprustalks.org/secretary-generals-statement-on-cyprus-25-november-2019/ 
29 Some of these initiatives are supported by the United Nations directly (e.g. the technical commitees operate under 
the UN peace talks while the CMP consists of two members appointed by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities respectively and a third Member selected by the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General).  See CMP webpage at http://www.cmp-
cyprus.org/content/about-cmp-0 
